INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF ACTIVE RESPONSE
The active response continuum defines a category of digital response to unauthorized digital intrusions 1 and hence falls within a wide spectrum of potential responses by private entities.
2 At one end of the spectrum is the wholly passive, unknowing victim who relies entirely on just the inherent capabilities of the software that comes with the computer he or she purchased and who does not know when it is being attacked. At the other is the active, fully engaged victim who deliberately pursues a series of discrete tactics with a set of well-defined objectives in mind. As the term "active" indicates, active response measures fall toward the latter end of the spectrum.
As defined in this chapter, measures falling within the active response continuum have the following characteristics. First, these measures are, of course, digitally based; physically assaulting someone who is committing a digital trespass would not be an instance of active response. Second, they are reactive in the sense that they are implemented following detection of an unwanted digital intrusion and are intended to counter the intrusion; as such, they are contrived to serve investigative, defensive, or punitive purposes. Third, they are noncooperative in at least the minimal sense of being implemented without the consent of at least one of the parties involved in or affected by the intrusion. Finally, they usually have causal impacts on remote systems (i.e., those owned or controlled by some other person). These tactics range from more benign information-gathering measures (e.g., tracebacks) that have an impact on remote systems without impairing their ongoing operations and functions to more aggressive measures (e.g., denial of service counterattacks) expressly intended to inhibit or even stop the operations and functions of remote systems.
At an intuitive level, the definition of "active response" attempts to pick out digital acts that would be characterized as hacking if performed without provocation. Theorists and policymakers have become concerned with the phenomena discussed in this chapter precisely because of their resemblance to hacker attacks; it is, for this reason, that active response measures are sometimes referred to as "counterhacking" or "hacking back." Although the definition of "active response" above picks out some acts (e.g., scanning ports) that are not fairly characterized as hacking, even those acts are minimally intrusive. Indeed, although they might very well be morally justified all things considered, they raise, at least initially, the same sorts of privacy and property concerns that are raised by acts that are fairly characterized as hacking.
The definition above also attempts to incorporate the idea that these measures are taken in response to an unauthorized intrusion. The idea that such measures are reactive implies that measures intended to detect the occurrence of an intrusion do not fall within the active response continuum. Reactive measures, as defined above, are deliberately contrived as a response to an intrusion that has previously been detected-though it is true, of course, that detection and response might sometimes proceed together as the intrusion continues.
Although many measures taken in response to computer intrusions fall within the active response continuum, not all do. Measures reasonably calculated to stop either an ongoing attack or the harm it is causing are typically characterized as defensive; however, active response measures can serve a variety of purposes that are not, strictly speaking, defensive in either of these respects. For example, information-gathering efforts can be related to efforts to adopt measures calculated to stop an attack or its harmful effects, but they can also be directed at providing law enforcement agencies with sufficient evidence to prosecute culpable parties. In addition, some measures characterized as active response are motivated by a desire to punish or retaliate against an attack-with little regard for whether such measures actually bring about its cessation. Accordingly, although active response tactics are sometimes adopted for defensive purposes, they are also frequently adopted for investigatory and offensive purposes-and, indeed, can be employed in ongoing information warfare. 3 Thus conceived, measures falling within the active response continuum are compatible with the efforts of law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute computer crimes. As is readily apparent, efforts by private victims to gather and preserve information about the attack can assist law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute an attack. Such information can provide not only helpful investigatory leads but can also form the foundation for the evidentiary base needed to prosecute culpable parties successfully.
Even so, it is worth emphasizing at the outset that active response measures are increasingly adopted by private firms as a substitute for involving law enforcement agencies. There are a variety of reasons for this practice. First, the resources available to law enforcement agencies for responding to digital intrusions have simply not kept pace with the frequency and severity of digital intrusions. The perceived decreasing success rate of law enforcement has led to a sense among private victims that it is far more efficient to respond without involving law enforcement. Second, and equally important, many commercial victims worry about the effects that publicizing an attack might have on their relationships with customers. The concern is that their customers would become alarmed after learning of security breaches and would ultimately respond by taking their business elsewhere. Therefore, such firms believe that the best way to minimize the risk of publicity and such deleterious effects is to respond internally to digital intrusions without involving law enforcement.
This chapter provides an overview of the active response continuum and considers the morality and legality of such tactics. It defines various levels of intrusion response in relation to the level of the victim's conscious involvement and posture, describes various technical barriers to active responses and the various ways in which law enforcement might be involved, characterizes active response measures along a spectrum ranging from benign to aggressive measures, and considers the ethicality and legality of responses falling along that spectrum.
It is important to keep in mind that the topic of active response is a novel one, with an academic and popular literature that is exceedingly small compared to the literature available for other security-related topics. As such, many of the descriptive and normative issues are currently being worked out by theoreticians and practitioners. As one might expect, then, theoreticians and practitioners disagree on a number of these issues. Such disagreements are not limited, however, to the usual ethical disagreements; they also encompass the descriptive classificatory claims that seek to distinguish the various levels and characteristics of active response. 4 For this reason, the analysis in this chapter should not be considered the final word on any of the issues considered below. As the topic of active response continues to attract more interest from practitioners, theoreticians, and ultimately lawmakers, one should expect that new descriptive taxonomies will emerge that may well change the normative landscape-changes that undoubtedly will result in changes in the content of existing law. Even so, this chapter is intended to provide a plausible conceptual and normative foundation for understanding the descriptive, ethical, and legal issues of active response and to enable the reader to follow the conversation as it evolves.
LEVELS OF INTRUSION RESPONSE
As a first step toward understanding active response, it is important to get a sense of the range of potential responses to digital intrusions. At least five different levels of intrusion response can be distinguished along a spectrum according to the degree of the victim's deliberative engagement. 5 The spectrum begins at Level 0 where the victim has almost no knowledge of the intrusion and is hence wholly unengaged and ends at Level 4 where the victim is fully engaged and is acting independently of other involved parties (Table 1) . Active response occurs primarily at this fourth level, which is itself divided into sublevels defining a subspectrum that progresses from less intrusive to more intrusive, less risky to more risky, and less disruptive to more disruptive sublevels of involvement.
Level 0-Unaware
The defining attribute of a Level 0 response is the utter lack of involvement of the attack victim: the victim has no knowledge of the intrusion and takes no action whatsoever. At Level 0, the victim (construed to include both the owner/operator of the computer system and the organization to which he or she reports) takes no active role in responding either directly or indirectly to an ongoing attack. Indeed, at Level 0, the victim does not so much as 4 This is because both the concept and the class of phenomena it attempts to pick out are novel; for this reason, there are simply no established conventions governing the use of the concept-term "active response." Accordingly, the concept is likely to evolve as researchers identify more salient features shared by measures plausibly characterized as active response. 5 We are indebted to attendees at the First Agora Workshop on Active Defense for this taxonomy and supporting analysis. The Agora, an information security group in Seattle, Washington, founded and led by Kirk Bailey (currently CISO for the City of Seattle), has held three workshops on the topic of active response, the first of which was held in June 8, 2001. Much of the terminology and description of the active response continuum here was derived by workshop participants through the assistance of Captain Jake Schaffner (USN Ret.), who co-moderated this first workshop with Nick Multari. An example of a Level 0 response is the typical homebroadband customer who purchases a computer through a retail outlet and knows very little about security issues or technologies. These naïve users pay little, if any, attention to patches, antivirus software, settings on Web browsers, and have no comprehension of plaintext password and other vulnerabilities. Such users lack the ability to discover when their computers are compromised by worms or viruses. In the event of an intrusion of some sort, they simply continue to operate their computers as usual.
This category of user is a common target for attackers wishing either to (1) retain anonymity through the use of stepping stones or proxies; (2) install malicious software that permits remote control of the computer for use in distributed attacks or intrusions (e.g., distributed denial of service attacks or distributed spam transmission); or (3) steal disk space for storage of stolen content (e.g., pirated software, data stolen from other compromised hosts, and cache malicious software).
Level 1-Involved
Level 1 responses involve minimal engagement on the part of the victim. The victim establishes (either directly or via proxy) a day-to-day defensive posture involving only resources within his or her ownership or operational control. Such resources may include (1) use and maintenance (i.e., updating to keep current) of commercial antivirus products; (2) use of personal firewall software to limit remote access to services installed as part of the operating system (e.g., Windows System Message Block and Net-BIOS name services); or (3) use of a hardware firewall between the network attach point and hosts in a local area network (e.g., a home LAN on a broadband cable). At this level, there is little interaction between the victim and the operations of these resources.
Level 1 responses are fairly characterized as passive, prophylactic, and silent. They are prophylactic in the sense that they are intended primarily to prevent attacks and do little to respond in an efficacious manner when an attack is detected. They are silent in the sense that the victim receives little input from the operation of these resources; for example, a victim at this level might not even have set up an antivirus program to alert him or her when a virus is detected. They are passive in the sense that the victim does not actively respond in any thoughtful way to the discovery of an intrusion. Even in instances where antivirus software alerts the victim to a threat of some kind, his or her response at this level is usually limited to accepting, without any significant deliberation, the recommendations made by the anti-virus software for cleanup.
Level 2-Interactive
This level is characterized by the beginning of an active engagement with the threat. At Level 2, the victim responds to evidence of an intrusion by taking minimally deliberative measures to modify resources under his or her ownership or control. A minimal Level 2 response, for example, may involve adjusting the security settings on a personal firewall to respond to a specific kind of detected threatperhaps configuring software to ignore pings. A more fully engaged Level 2 response may involve looking up domain registry information for the Internet protocol (IP) of the "attacking system" 6 and reporting the attempted intrusion or actual compromise to the site that owns this IP. In some cases, the victim at this level may go so far as to report these events to incident coordination sites, such as CERT/CC, 7 and/or to law enforcement. Though Level-2 responses actively engage the threat in some way, the extent of engagement is comparatively unsophisticated. These victims make little effort to investigate the intrusion or to perform a forensic analysis of compromised hosts, and are content to rely on others to take action (e.g., the victim's incident response team or law-enforcement agencies). At this level, victims typically respond to a successful intrusion by formatting the drive and re-installing the operating system.
Level 3-Cooperative
Level 3 is distinguished from lower levels in that it involves an attempt on the part of the victim to reach out beyond those resources owned or operated by him or her. At Level 3, the victim attempts to enlist the cooperation of other organizations/systems in taking joint measures intended to attribute, mitigate, or eliminate the threat. It is important to note that the causal effects of action at this level extend for the first time beyond the victim's own resources.
There are a variety of Level 3 responses available to victims. Victims can, for example, identify an attacking site either by using domain registry information or by tracing the routing path to the site. Victims can then contact the attacking site itself or the upstream provider (e.g., in cases where it is suspected that the attacking site is potentially hostile, under the attacker's control, or unresponsive to previous communications). When contacting the attacking site or upstream provider, the victim may seek to share information about the intrusion, preserve critical information, or request that the other site contact local law enforcement agencies.
The efficacy of a Level 3 response obviously depends on quality cooperation from essential parties. For example, a successful Level 3 traceback is possible only if each of the parties acts with proper speed and shares needed information with other parties (and with law enforcement).
A coordinated cooperative response, however, is not always easy to achieve. Such a response is less likely when parties (1) are unable to get in touch with each other, (2) do not speak the same language, (3) have different skill levels, or (4) have different understandings of what is occurring and how best to respond. Any one of these inhibiting factors can contribute to an ineffective response and hence to a situation where the attacker is essentially unimpeded and at little risk of being caught.
A final important point to understand is that a multisite intrusion will not be entirely resolved, taking all compromised systems out of the hands of the attacker(s) unless each and every site involved is able to effectively work at Level 3, identifying all compromised hosts within their own network boundaries, and doing so at roughly the same time. If this cannot be achieved, sites that have "cleaned up" can, and often are, immediately recompromised by way of exploitation of trust relationships at sites that have not yet cleaned up. These trust relationships were the vector for compromise in the first place, and are very difficult to entirely identify and clean up adequately, which leads to multi-site intrusions sometimes lasting several months. (In some cases, compromised hosts are never identified and cleaned up.)
Level 4-Non-cooperative
A Level 4 response is characterized by deliberately unilateral steps-that is, without cooperative support from other parties-to identify, mitigate, or eliminate the threat by means that involve causal interaction with remote systems. These steps might be taken against an uncooperative perpetrator; or they might be taken against an organization or system that could (if cooperative) attribute, mitigate, or eliminate the threat. Such steps include noncooperative intelligence gathering, noncooperative "cease-and-desist" measures, counterstrikes designed to retaliate against attackers and deter future attacks, and preemptive measures.
Noncooperative Intelligence Gathering
Noncooperative intelligence gathering involves unilateral attempts by one victim site to gather information from another victim site without the latter's permission by means that might be regarded as intrusive. For example, victims can scan ports in an attempt to obtain information from enabled and non-access-controlled services on the attacking host, such as Windows NetBIOS information (e.g., host name, Windows domain, login accounts, and services enabled), NFS mount points, process information, and last login information. Though there is controversy about whether port scans should be characterized as intrusive, many persons feel they impinge privacy and hence would regard them as intrusive-whether rightly or wrongly.
Noncooperative intelligence gathering can cause conflicts among victim sites. Suppose, for example, that site A takes it upon itself to scan the network of site B, attempting, say, to identify back doors or similar systems to those compromised at site A. Even if A attempts to cooperate with B by providing it with the results of the analysis to help B improve its understanding of the attack, B might still consider A's action objectionably intrusive if B feels its privacy has been threatened.
Such measures can also have the unintended effect of providing useful information to the attacker. If the attacker notices that A is scanning an attacked system, the attacker may respond by attempting to eliminate evidence of his or her presence in the system by deleting files and reinitializing hosts being used as stepping stones (including routers.) The effects of noncooperative measures in such circumstances not only make it more difficult to identify the attacker but can also result in further damage to the compromised system if the attacker deletes valuable files.
Noncooperative Cease-and-desist Measures
Noncooperative cease-and-desist measures are contrived to stop an attack by rendering the attacking machines inoperable and hence, unlike the measures previously discussed, are intended to have a causal impact on someone else's computers in a direct and functional way. For example, a victim might attempt to shut off distributed denial of service (DDoS) agents by using vulnerabilities in those programs to inject commands or by targeting known vulnerabilities (e.g., the Windows RPC/DCOM vulnerability exploited by the MSBlast and Nachi worms) in ways that cause infected systems to crash. Noncooperative cease-and-desist measures, then, are expressly contrived to impair the operation and functioning of remote systems, causally affecting them in a much more intrusive way than the measures discussed previously.
Retribution or Counterstrike
Retributive or counterstrike measures are fairly characterized as the most aggressive active response tactics. As the name suggests, these measures are contrived to retaliate against attacking machines by inflicting something that is likely to be perceived as damage or a harm of some kind by the attacker (or unknowing agents). The structure of a counterstrike may mirror the structure of the attack or it may differ in key respects. However, in every case the immediate point is to inflict harm and is usually motivated ultimately by a desire to either stop or punish the attack. Like noncooperative cease-and-desist measures, retributive counterstrikes are intended to have a causal impact on the operations and functioning of remote systems.
There have been many cases where victims have responded to an attack by counterattacking the suspected attacker. A few years ago, for example, e-hippies launched a denial of service (DoS) attack on WTO servers hosted by Conxion.
8 Conxion responded by redirecting the incoming packets back to the attacking network (Radcliff, 2000a) . The counterstrike succeeded in stopping the attack and is fairly characterized as defensive in part, but it was also partly punitive because Conxion could have ended the attack by simply dropping the packets at the router.
Though Conxion's counterstrike succeeded in ending the attack, it is generally imprudent (i.e., likely to harm one's own interests) 9 to respond to an attack with such aggressive measures. First, such measures are more likely to escalate a conflict than end it. Someone who initiates an attack is likely to respond to a counterattack with more force if it can be mustered. Unfortunately, even novice hackers can find a way to deploy a substantial number of machines (either by getting direct control over them or by enlisting the help of other parties) to stage large-scale DDoS attacks. In such cases, the numbers of hosts attacking the victim site may number in the tens of thousands 10 , significantly complicating incident response.
Second, as is discussed in more detail below, such measures are of highly dubious legality. Shutting down attacking hosts is a heavy-handed measure that can have negative consequences that require a significant expenditure of resources on the part of the sites who own the hosts being attacked. In an increasingly litigious international culture, the unwanted cost of such measures might be expensive legal action against you for taking aggressive action.
Preemptive Response
A recent development in the law of Singapore suggests the possibility of taking legal action to preempt an attack before it is staged. In November 2003, Singapore enacted changes to its Computer Misuse Act that allow the government to take preemptive action against hackers. The old law, as with computer abuse statutes in every other nation, allowed authorities to act only after a hacker had committed a crime. The changes to Singapore's law allow the Singapore government to take unspecified actions to prevent an imminent attack by hackers against critical national infrastructures, imposing a maximum of 3 years in jail or a fine of up to 10,000 Singapore dollars (US$5,750) if convicted of preparing to stage a digital attack.
11
8 Hack back, By Deborah Radcliff, Network World, 05/29/00, http://www. nwfusion.com/ 9 Prudential considerations are distinct from ethical or legal considerations-though they may overlap. What is in one's self-interest may not be either ethical or legal, and conversely. 10 A Scotland Yard detective has stated that "small groups of young people creating a resource out of a 10,000-to 30,000-strong computer [bot] network are renting them out to anybody who has the money" Scotland Yard, 2004). 11 There exist no other comparable laws at the time of writing, and it is not clear under what circumstances a justification could be made that taking preemptive action against an attacker by government or private sector owner/operators was warranted.
Public preemptive response poses a host of practical difficulties. The state must have sufficient intelligence capabilities to be able to detect and identify potential attacks accurately before they are staged. These capabilities are, of course, very expensive to maintain and deploy, 12 but also have a variety of other social costs. For example, the public may perceive a decrease in its personal privacy without a reasonable increase in security against terrorist actions. Further, law enforcement agencies may begin arresting the wrong people, negatively affecting the overall law enforcement effort, as well as diminishing the public's sense that it is treated fairly and justly by law enforcement agencies.
POTENTIAL TECHNICAL BARRIERS FOR INTRUSION RESPONSE
Several factors can complicate efforts to implement an effective response to a digital intrusion. First, digital evidence is somewhat less durable than material evidence, complicating efforts to understand an attack and identify its ultimate source. Second, the victim must understand the structure of an attack to determine an appropriate response. Third, digital attackers have a variety of sophisticated tools for effectively concealing their identities and frustrating efforts by victims to understand an attack.
Volatility of Digital Information
In Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving, Dominique Brezinski and Tom Killalea (2002) elaborate several "best practices" for collecting information during an intrusion that take into account the durability of digital evidence. In particular, they recommend attempting to collect information according to "order of volatility"; that is, collecting information in order of durability starting, of course, with the information that is least durable. Brezinski and Killalea characterize the following sources of information in a hierarchy from most to least volatile: r registers, cache r routing table, ARP cache (host route information), process table, kernel statistics, memory r temporary file systems r disk r remote logging and monitoring data that are relevant to the system in question r physical configuration, network topology r archival media.
Understanding this order is important in considering an active response because much of the data needed by the victim to understand an attack are extremely volatile. For example, an analysis of network flows and actual packets, which are at the top of the hierarchy, is crucial to understanding the structure and methodology of an intrusion. 
Understanding Attack Methodology
A victim of a digital attack cannot mount an appropriate response of any kind beyond Level 1 without having some understanding of the attack's structure and methodology. Even an effective interactive response (Level 2) requires some understanding of the basic characteristics of the attack; a victim cannot modify software and hardware in a genuinely responsive way without understanding the attack's methodology and structure. 13 Similarly, a victim cannot implement an appropriate Level 4 response without understanding the attack; one cannot determine whether a response is both legally permissible and likely to meet legitimate objectives without some such understanding.
In addition to understanding the attack methodology and structure, there are other skills and resources required to engage in a meaningful and complete defense. It is important to have an up-to-minute "view of the battle space" to see how it changes during the conflict. Advanced attacks typically require reconnaissance of the network and take advantage of knowledge about the network topology and trust relationships between hosts of which most defenders are unaware.
14 For example, a defender may have two options for obtaining a piece of information about the attack, one that is detectable by the attacker and one that is not. If the defender is not aware that there are two options or unknowingly chooses the detectable option, thinking it to be the only appropriate one, the attacker may learn of the defender's pursuit and avoid the defensive action, return through remaining back doors, and possibly do significant damage as he or she "bugs out" of the network.
Attribution
Preparing an active response that is both appropriate and likely to be efficacious depends on identifying both the immediate (i.e., innocent agents) and ultimate (i.e., culpable attacker) sources of an attack; that is, it depends on an accurate "attribution" of the attack to all the parties that are responsible either immediately or ultimately for the attack. Accurate attribution is obviously important because the responses by the military, the intelligence community, federal law enforcement, and the business community will differ radically depending on who is responsible for the attack. 13 However, knowledge sufficient to enable a Level-2 response is still quite limited, potentially putting a victim with sensitive customer information in a position of increased liability for negligence in handling sensitive information. Such issues have not yet been addressed by the courts. 14 See, for example, Col. John Boyd, OODA Loop http://www.mindsim. com/MindSim/Corporate/OODA.html. OODA stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act and describes a complex relationship among the following variables: (1) observation, (2) prior experience, (3) an innate understanding of options that one can take at any given point to counter an attacker's moves, (4) an equal understanding of the expected outcome of those actions, and (5) the ability to come back to observations that confirm whether the expected outcome was obtained. The OODA Loop is neither a simple loop containing one path nor a "play book" that can be consulted and acted out without thought. The OODA Loop relates the attacker's and defender's abilities to see the battlefield, their understanding of the options for action, and knowledge of how to act appropriately in response to the attack.
Unfortunately, attribution can be extremely difficult. First, there are always a large number of possible culprits in any substantial Internet attack. The ultimate source of an attack could be (1) an unskilled "script-kiddie" using ready-made tools he or she downloaded from the Web, (2) a "black hat by night" employee of a large security company trying to increase market demand for his or her company's products, (3) a nation-state actor developing and testing an information warfare capability, (4) a spammer's hired gun who is trying to attack those who want to end spam or who is trying to establish a massive spam delivery network of compromised hosts, or (5) a terrorist organization trying to find a way to affect the economy by disrupting important businesses. Second, reasonably sophisticated attackers typically conceal their identities by using stepping stones, open wireless access points, stolen credit card numbers, cell phones with built in modems, and dialin services without caller-ID. These factors make reliable traceback and accurate attribution extremely challenging.
INVOLVING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Law enforcement agencies are best able to respond effectively to a computer crime when they have a comprehensive, organized package of information, including damage estimates. Most law enforcement agencies have standard forms for reporting cybercrimes. For example, the Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP, formerly the National Infrastructure Protection Center, or NIPC) has both an online form and a PDF file for reporting cybercrimes (see http://www.us-cert.gov/).
It can also be useful to contact law enforcement agents to alert them when large-scale or technologically unusual computer network attacks are under way. Doing so provides agents with advance warning of potential workload, as well as allowing them to correlate incidents involving multiple sites. Law enforcement agents may have access to information not readily available to the general public that reveals the larger picture, but that picture cannot be appreciated fully if victim sites do not recognize attacks above the level of "script-kiddies" and report them to law enforcement. Understanding and using their standard reporting forms when communicating with law enforcement can facilitate an efficacious response.
LEVELS OF FORCE: BENIGN THROUGH AGGRESSIVE RESPONSES
This section classifies various intrusion responses according to levels of "force." Although there are clear differences between physically forceful actions and digitally intrusive actions, there are sufficient similarities to justify characterizing the latter as involving force of some kind. Despite the probable limits to the analogy between digital and physical force, these limits are of little importance here and can be disregarded safely. Table 2 shows the levels of force. 
Benign
Benign activities are those involving operations that have no direct causal effects on remote systems and are not adopted from a self-consciously noncooperative posture or attitude. Such measures include operations intended to gather information, as well as to address or correct vulnerabilities in the victim's networks. Most benign measures do not fall within the active response continuum as that concept was defined above, but some do-for an interesting reason. Some benign measures potentially affect the legitimate interests of other persons even if, strictly speaking, they do not have a causal impact on remote systems. Third parties may have legitimate privacy interests implicated by measures that have a causal impact on only those systems owned or controlled by the victim. If, for example, the victim is an Internet service provider renting Internet access and storage to a third party, measures that have a causal impact on only those resources within the victim's ownership or control may affect the legitimate moral interests of the victim. Insofar as the victim takes unilateral action without obtaining consent from interested third parties in situations in which consent is required ethically or legally, such action is fairly characterized as "noncooperative"-as opposed to "uncooperative." Although the latter term presupposes a deliberate refusal to behave in a cooperative way, the former notion does not. Thus, behaviors that are not cooperative in circumstances in which cooperation is required are "noncooperative" even if the failure to cooperate is unknowing. Unilateral benign measures that potentially infringe the legitimate interests of third parties, then, are fairly characterized as noncooperative and hence as active response.
Sniffing
Sniffing (i.e., monitoring of network traffic) can occur only on LAN segments. This requires access to a device on the LAN on which you wish to sniff (e.g., connected to a wall port in a switched network, or ability to associated with a wireless access point.). Attackers using sniffers typically take over a computer and use its interface to promiscuously capture all traffic that is accessible to that host. Using techniques that manipulate link-level traffic management functions, such as ARP cache poisoning and MAC table overflowing in switches, switches and virtual local area networks (VLANs) can sometimes be bypassed to increase the traffic that can be sniffed. Routers themselves are sometimes compromised and used to sniff traffic as well. Laws that prohibit monitoring of electronic communications typically have exemptions for owners and operators of networks or telecommunications systems and for those with authority for the investigation of breaches in network security; these exceptions allow such persons to monitor traffic. The main requirement is that the activity be done for protection of the network and computers involved.
Readdressing Hosts or Networks
Attackers commonly attempt to map out network infrastructure to determine how to achieve their objectives inside the target network-a process that can take months or even years to complete if an attacker is trying to do it with stealth (a so-called low and slow scan.) If the victim can rapidly readdress hosts and devices on its network after the commencement of an attack, the victim can effectively blind the attacker and force him or her to rescan the network. This may enable victims to detect the systems from which attackers are implementing scans and to identify hosts that are being used as stepping stones.
Deception Using Honeypots
Honeypots, as commonly defined, are computer resources installed for the purpose of being compromised (see The Use of Deception Techniques: Honeypots and Decoys in this Handbook; http://project.honeynet.org/papers/ honeynet/index.html). Honeypots can be used to augment existing firewalls and intrusion detection systems to identify malicious activity. Some honeypots not only appear to provide services desired by an attacker, but can also mimic the operating system fingerprint that results when an attacker scans the network with certain tools. In that attack situation, a defender can readdress certain hosts on the network, configure a system running those honeypots to replace the existing systems, and make it look like there are many more on the network just like it.
Scanning
The attacker uses scanning to learn about the topology of the network and the devices being used, and the victim can do the same. Understanding the vulnerabilities being exploited by an attacker is essential to an effective response; scanning can help the victim find vulnerable and compromised hosts, thereby facilitating cleanup and evidence preservation. Indeed, a victim can continually scan his or her network to build an historical database of operating systems, listening ports, and services that can be queried on demand when investigating an attack to find all hosts matching a known exploitable profile. By performing a continual comparison of this same information, changes over time can be detected, which may signal intrusion activity. There are passive ways of gaining this same intelligence through monitoring network flows, although this monitoring only identifies hosts that are actively "talking" on the network.
Session Hijacking/TCP Session "Sniping"
There are tools that enable a victim to hijack and terminate established transmission control protocol (TCP) sessions, as well as prevent new connections from being established. The careless and sporadic use of such tools is, however, likely to be noticed by the attacker-though an attacker could always misinterpret the results as having been caused by intermittent network failures. However, it is important to note that these tools are generally efficacious only if used on the same LAN segment as the hosts the attacker is using.
Intermediate
Activities in this category involve causal interaction with remote systems outside a defender's network, but are neither intended nor reasonably likely to cause harm to those systems. It is worth noting that noncooperative measures falling in this category are fairly characterized as active response as this notion was defined above-though, again, the reader is cautioned not to draw any substantive normative conclusions merely on the strength of a characterization of something as involving, or not involving, active response. The above taxonomy can assist a normative analysis, but is no substitute for such an analysis.
Following Attack Paths in Reverse
Victims can attempt to follow attack paths back to the ultimate source of an attack. If a victim knows (1) the attacker's methodology for using back doors and exposed network services for establishing stepping stones or proxy relays, (2) the passwords and/or account names favored by the attacker, and (3) the IP addresses used for entry/exit from the victim's network, he or she can follow the attacker's trails backwards through the network. Tracing attack paths through systems within the victim's own network can be done without much worry if there are policies that allow this activity. Tracing attack paths through systems not directly owned or controlled by the victim might be ethically or legally problematic insofar as such actions have a causal impact on innocent parties. In either event, there is always a danger of destroying the time-line of events by changing the Modify-Access-Create time stamps on affected systems.
Remote Evidence Collection
Victims who enter a remote system have the same evidence-gathering abilities as they have on their own networks. This evidence can be in the form of output of commands that show running processes, last logins, and network connection states or can be in the form of contents of directories or even entire file system bit images. Such measures are problematic if criminal codes (involving, say, stored electronic communications) apply. 
Aggressive
Actions defined here as aggressive are reasonably likely to interfere with the availability, integrity, confidentiality, or authenticity of information systems outside one's own network. Aggressive measures include those intended or highly likely to result in something that the target would regard as harm or damage. Aggressive actions are all fairly characterized as active response since, as a conceptual matter, only a noncooperative act can be aggressive.
Remote Exploitation
One class of aggressive measures involves victim penetration and exploitation of remote systems. Understanding a remote system's vulnerabilities can allow the victim to penetrate those systems using exploit programs (i.e., programs that take advantage of vulnerabilities in a computer system to gain access.) These programs may include exploits used by the attacker within the victim's own system.
16
There are several serious risks here that counsel against use of such measures. First, remote exploitation can cause major disruption to the host if the exploit crashes servers, network stacks, or the operating system itself. Second, it can leave digital tracks that the attacker would notice. Third, it can be detected by the site's incident handlers and treated as though it were a separate computer crime.
Corruption of Data
Another class of aggressive measures involves alteration of data being used by the attacker. In a case where it is known that the attacker is using a file system cache to store sniffer or vulnerability scanner logs, an effective response can involve the targeted editing or destruction of some or all of these files. Because it can take significant time for an attacker to successfully identify new hosts to attack, such measures can force the attacker to return to certain hosts or networks. At the very least, they can delay the attacker for long enough to allow the victim to finish an analysis of malware artifacts or system images and to gather new network flow information. However, it is important to realize that these actions can also destroy evidence that could be used in a criminal prosecution and may themselves violate criminal prohibitions on digital intrusions.
Disabling Services on Remote Systems
Knowledge of services being used by the attacker on remote systems, together with the possession of accounts/passwords or knowledge of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities in these services, can enable a victim to disable them. The risks here are that (1) disabling the service could have a negative impact on the host or its users; (2) the service would simply be restarted as a normal course of system operation (e.g., through a monitoring daemon, Act, however, allows law enforcement to monitor and use such communications if, among other things, relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. 16 Victims should always have a healthy distrust of programs in an attacker's possession, unless they have thoroughly reverse engineered them or verified their integrity from known trusted public sources. a scheduled process, or manually by the system administrator); and (3) the attacker has a means for restarting the service. Many rootkits include multiple back doors and/or remote command execution facilities that can be used to restart services; for this reason, a sound understanding of the malware involved and of success probabilities are needed to obtain the desired goal (i.e., shutting down access to the attacker), as well as to avoid alerting attackers that such measures are being pursued.
Denial of Service
Another possibility is to use remotely exploitable vulnerabilities to cause hosts or the network infrastructure itself to fail at the other site, thereby taking control of remote systems out of the hands of the attacker, or overwhelming the network bandwidth of the site to the same end. The effect of such measures is to deny users access to the contents of the other site and hence to "deny service" to them.
Denial of service (DoS) responses are highly aggressive measures that are problematic for several reasons (see Denial of Service in this Handbook). First, such responses can have unforeseeable catastrophic effects on remote sites that are not unreasonably characterized as "collateral damage." For example, it might be likely that a DoS response could cause physical damage to a system involved in critical patient care, potentially resulting in risk of harm or even in the death of a patient. 17 Similarly, it could be that a DoS response might result in financial losses that well exceed the value of the resources the victim is attempting to defend and in the worst-case scenario result in the losses of jobs of innocent persons. Second, it is rarely clear that denial of service will accomplish the goal of removing access to the compromised systems. In largescale attacks where the attacker controls tens or hundreds of thousands of servers, the victim typically lacks the ability to deny service to all of them.
18 Third, there is the possibility that the counterattack would simply be filtered out somewhere between the attacking network and the target networks. Not only will the counterattack fail as a means of removing control of these systems by the attacker, it may even disrupt the victim's own network connectivity as a result.
THE ETHICS OF ACTIVE RESPONSE
This section is concerned with whether it is ethically permissible for private parties to adopt the various active response measures described above in response to a digital attack. The structure of the analysis is as follows. The first section attempts to identify each of 17 Arguably, the hospital would be negligent for having linked critical lifesaving functions to a network that can be easily crashed by a remote DoS attack; however, this does not diminish the culpability of the party who performed the DoS attack as an active response measure in the first placeor the severity of the consequences. 18 It is not uncommon for an attacker to control 10,000 hosts in a DDoS network or networks. In 2003, CERT/CC reported they were tracking a bot network of over 140,000 hosts (CERT Advisory, 2003) . In 2004, a network of Phatbot "blended threat" bots (which include denial of service capability) involving 400,000 hosts was observed by Symantec (Krebs, 2004) , and the Association of Realtime Gambling Operators reported to the British All Party Internet Group that 518,000 hosts were used to attack one of their members. (ARGO, 2004.) the substantive ethical principles potentially relevant in evaluating whether a particular active response strategy is permissible. The second section identifies an additional ethical principle that states an evidentiary precondition for justifiably acting on other substantive ethical principles (such as those identified in the first section). Finally, the third section applies these principles to aggressive, intermediate, and benign active response measures.
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One preliminary observation is in order here. As is standard in the area of applied ethics, the analysis here does not presuppose any particular general ethical theory like utilitarianism or Kantianism. Instead, the analysis purports to be grounded in general principles, and specific case judgments figure prominently in ordinary ethical judgments and practices. Accordingly, the analysis paper begins by identifying ethical principles that are commonly accepted in Western industrialized nations 20 and proceeds by attempting to identify the implications of those widespread commitments with respect to the various levels of active response.
Relevant Ethical Principles Allowing Force in Defense of Self and Others
It is generally accepted in Western nations that a person has a moral right to use proportional force when necessary to defend against an attack. If, for example, A is shooting at B without provocation and B cannot save his or her own life without shooting A, it is permissible, according to ordinary judgments, for B to shoot A. If, however, A starts hitting B without provocation, it would be impermissible for B to shoot at A; because B's right of self-defense is limited to directing proportional force at A, it is permissible for B only to hit A.
The first ethical principle considered here, then, is a familiar one that allows a person to use proportional force when necessary to defend against an attack:
The Defense Principle: It is morally permissible for one person to use force to defend him-or herself or other innocent persons against an attack provided that (1) such force is proportional to the force used in the attack, (2) such force is necessary either to repel the attack or to prevent the attack from resulting in harm of some kind, and (3) such force is directed at and is reasonably likely to harm only those persons who are responsible for the attack.
Although the term "force" has traditionally been used to describe violent physical attacks in which one person 19 There are two reasons for structuring the analysis this way. First, each of the various levels of active response must be evaluated under each of the ethical principles. Second, each of the various substantive principles is qualified by the evidentiary precondition discussed in the second section. For this reason, the analysis must begin by identifying all of the relevant substantive and evidentiary principles before considering how any one might apply to some active response measure. 20 Here it is worth noting that the principles identified here are incorporated into the law of every Western industrialized nation. To the extent that most people accept those laws as legitimate, it is reasonable to conclude that most people believe they are just-and hence reflect the content of morality.
attempts to inflict physical harm on another person, it is reasonably construed here as applying to both physical and digital attacks.
Each of the elements of the Defense Principle states a necessary condition for the use of force. First, it justifies only force that is proportional to that used in the attack. Second, force must be necessary in the sense that the victim cannot stop the attack or prevent further harm to himor herself without resorting to force. Third, the Defense Principle justifies the use of force only against persons directly responsible for the attack. Although some (but by no means all) theorists believe this element allows the use of force against an attacker who is innocent of wrongdoing (perhaps because he or she is clinically insane), all agree that the Defense Principle does not justify force against an innocent bystander.
At this juncture, it is worth noting that the Defense Principle will hence justify, at most, forceful active response measures directed at the owners of innocent agent machines; such machines are fairly characterized as "innocent attackers" rather than "innocent bystanders." Active response measures that have significant impacts on innocent bystanders will likely face difficulties under the Defense Principle.
Allowing Otherwise Wrongful Acts to Secure the Greater Moral Good
It is also generally accepted in Western nations that morality allows the infringement (as opposed to violation) of an innocent person's rights when necessary to secure a significantly greater good. 21 For example, if A must enter onto the property of B without permission in order to stop a murderer from escaping, it is morally permissible for A to do so. Though such an act constitutes a prima facie trespass and hence infringes B's property rights, it does not violate B's property rights because it is morally justified.
There are four considerations that explain this judgment. First, stopping a dangerous murderer from escaping into the general population where he or she is likely to do more harm has great moral value. Second, it is not possible for A to achieve such moral value without coming onto B's land without permission. Third, the threat to the interests of the public is, from a moral point of view, significantly greater than the threat to B's interests. Fourth, A's intent in committing the putative trespass is morally respectable (i.e., to save the public from such a grave risk) and is hence properly respectful towards B.
Putting these four features together suggests a second general principle that might be applicable in evaluating active response:
The Necessity Principle: It is morally permissible for one person A to infringe a right ρ of 21 By definition, to say that a right has been "infringed" is to say only that someone has acted in a way that is inconsistent with the holder's interest in that right; strictly speaking, then, the claim that a right has been infringed is a purely descriptive claim that connotes no moral judgment as to whether the infringement is wrong. In contrast, to say that a right has been "violated" is to say that the right has been infringed by some act and that the relevant act is morally wrong. Accordingly, it is a conceptual truth that it can be permissible for an individual or entity to infringe a right, but it cannot be permissible to violate a right. a person B if and only if (1) A's infringing of ρ would result in great moral value; (2) the good that is protected by ρ is significantly less valuable, morally speaking, than the good A can bring about by infringing ρ; (3) there is no other way for A to bring about this moral value that does not involve infringing ρ; and (4) A's attitude toward B 's rights is otherwise properly respectful.
Like the Defense Principle, the Necessity Principle is construed here as applying in the context of both physical and digital attacks.
The Necessity Principle augments the Defense Principle by allowing acts that would infringe the rights of even innocent bystanders: the Necessity Principle seems to allow one person A to infringe the right of an innocent bystander B if necessary to defend A or some other person from a culpable attack that would result in a significantly greater harm than results from infringing B's right. However, insofar as the Necessity Principle requires the achievement of a significantly greater good, it does not allow a person to direct at an innocent bystander force that is fully proportional to the force of the attack.
The Necessity Principle is, thus, dissimilar to the Defense Principle in one respect that is significant for the evaluation of active response. Unlike the Defense Principle, the Necessity Principle potentially allows active response measures that have significant impacts on innocent bystanders. Even so, it is clear that the Necessity Principle will allow impacts on innocent bystanders only if the moral value of using the relevant active response measure significantly outweighs the moral disvalue of such impacts.
Punitive or Retaliatory Principles
It might be thought that victims of an attack have a moral right to retaliate against or punish their attackers by inflicting a morally proportional harm on their attackers. If, for example, A hits B in the face and then turns and runs away in an obvious attempt to escape, it is ethically permissible, in this view, for B to catch A and then hit him back in the face. B's retaliatory act is justified because it gives A what A deserves and thereby restores the balance of justice that was disturbed by A's morally wrongful act. Applied to the present context, such an analysis would permit the victim of a digital attack to respond with force as a means of "evening the score." Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that, in any society with a morally legitimate government, it is ethically impermissible for citizens to punish or retaliate against wrongdoing. Mainstream political theorists are unanimous in holding that it is the province of governmentand not the individual-in such societies to punish wrongdoers after they have been found guilty in a fair trial. Indeed, vigilantism is universally condemned as wrong: so long as the state is reasonably effective in prosecuting and punishing wrongdoing, citizens are morally prohibited from forceful self-help. 22 As a general matter, it is 22 Such an analysis is presupposed by Jayawal, Yurcik, and Doss (2002) . The assumption is that self-defense is legitimate, but not retaliatory measures (which are implicitly condemned as "vigilantism").
wrong for private victims to even the score by retaliating or punishing attackers.
23

An Evidentiary Restriction for Justifiably Acting Under Ethical Principles
Most theorists and laypersons agree that we have a duty to ensure we have correctly identified the facts and applicable ethical principle before taking action against a person on the strength of that principle. Suppose, for example, that A believes without good reason that B has wronged A in some way. If A takes action against B under a principle P without having a minimally adequate reason for thinking that P applies (say, because A lacks a minimally adequate reason to think that B has committed a wrong), then A has committed a wrong against B. A has a duty to be at least minimally justified in believing that P governs the situation; if A does not satisfy this duty, then A must give B the benefit of the doubt before acting on P until A has better evidence that P does, in fact, apply. There is thus a third principle that is relevant with respect to evaluating active response measures-one that is evidentiary or, as theorists of knowledge put it, "epistemic" in character:
The Evidentiary Principle: It is morally permissible for one person A to take action under an ethical principle P only if A has adequate reason for thinking that all of the necessary conditions for applying P are satisfied.
The Evidentiary Principle defines a moral duty to ensure that one is epistemically justified in acting under the relevant moral principles. If one person A takes aggressive action against another person B without having sufficient reason for believing the application-conditions of the relevant principle have been satisfied, A has wronged B.
Accordingly, the victim of a digital attack can permissibly adopt active response measures only if he or she has adequate reason to think the application-conditions of at least one of the relevant principles are satisfied. Under the Defense Principle, the victim must have adequate reason to believe that (1) whatever force is employed is proportional to the force used in the attack, (2) such force is necessary either to repel the attack or to prevent the attack from resulting in harm of some kind, and (3) such force is directed only at persons who are responsible for the attack. Under the Necessity Principle, the victim must have adequate reason to believe that (1) the relevant moral value significantly outweighs the relevant moral disvalue, (2) there is no other way to achieve the greater moral good than to do A, and (3) doing A will succeed in achieving the greater moral good. If the victim lacks reason to think the application-conditions of both rules are satisfied and if these are the only relevant rules, then it would be wrong for him or her to adopt active response measures that infringe the rights of any innocent person.
Evaluating Active Response Under the Relevant Ethical Principles
In evaluating active response under the Defense, Necessity, and Evidentiary Principles, it is important to realize that the risk that active response measures will affect innocent persons is not purely "theoretical." Sophisticated attackers usually conceal their identities by staging attacks from innocent machines that have been compromised through a variety of mechanisms. Most active responses will have to be directed, at least in part, at the agent machines used to stage the attack. Given that innocent persons enjoy a general moral immunity against force, the likelihood of affecting innocent persons with active response occupies a central role in evaluating those responses under the Defense, Necessity and Evidentiary Principles.
Aggressive Measures
In many instances, aggressive active response cannot be justified by the Defense Principle. Consider Conxion's denial of service response to the attack by e-hippies on World Trade Organization servers a few years ago. Because dropping the packets at the router would have stopped the harmful effects of the E-hippies attack, Conxion's response was not "necessary" to defend against those attacks and was not justified under the Defense Principle.
Indeed, characterizing such measures as "defensive" radically mischaracterizes them. Conxion's aggressive response cannot accurately be characterized as defensive because it was not needed to stop either the attack or the harmful effects of the attack. Indeed, the reason why Conxion adopted the more aggressive response was that it wished to inflict exactly the same kind of harm on the ehippies' servers that the e-hippies intended to inflict on the WTO servers. For this reason, Conxion's objective was at least partly punitive or retaliatory in character. Because, as we have seen, it is generally impermissible for private parties (as opposed to the state) to punish an attack or forcefully retaliate against it, Conxion's response was unethical.
Additional ethical issues are raised by aggressive defense measures directed against attacks staged from innocent agent machines. Because the identity of the culpable attacker is generally unknown in such cases, any aggressive response will be directed at the innocent agents compromised by the attacker, which compounds the harms done to the owners of those machines. Although the agent machines are more plausibly characterized as "innocent attackers" than as "innocent bystanders," theorists disagree about whether the Defense Principle allows a forceful response to an innocent attacker. This disagreement, however, suggests that a victim of a digital attack lacks adequate reason to think that the Defense Principle would allow aggressive measures against innocent parties. Because it follows that the victim lacks adequate reason to think the application-conditions of the Defense Principle are satisfied, aggressive responses should be presumed unethical under the Evidentiary Principle.
Aggressive defense is also problematic under the Necessity Principle. Even assuming an aggressive response is necessary to achieve the greater moral good of preventing the damage caused by an attack, an aggressive response may result in unpredictable harms that outweigh the relevant moral goods. Machines can be linked via a network to one another in unpredictable ways, making it impossible to identify all the harmful effects of an aggressive response in advance. Ethically significant "collateral damage" can be ruled out reliably in only a small class of exceptional cases.
Indeed, a variety of intranational and international worst-case scenarios are unfortunately possible. Suppose, for example, that an attacker compromises machines on a university network linked to a university hospital. If hospital machines performing a life-saving function are linked to the network, an aggressive response against that network might result in a loss of human life. Even worse, suppose that an attacker compromises machines used by one nation's government to attack private machines in another nation. If the two nations are hostile toward each other, an aggressive response by the private victim could raise international tensions-a particularly chilling prospect if the two nations are nuclear powers.
The point here is not that we have reason to think that these worst-case scenarios are very likely; rather, we do not have any reliable way to determine how likely they are. A victim contemplating an aggressive response has no reliable way to estimate the probabilities of such scenarios in the short time available to him or her. Because the victim cannot reliably assess these probabilities, he or she lacks adequate reason to think that the applicationconditions of the Necessity Principle are satisfied. Thus, under the Evidentiary Principle, the victim may not justifiably adopt aggressive measures under this principle.
Intermediate Responses
Intermediate active responses typically include exploratory tracebacks that attempt to identify culpable attackers by following attack paths in reverse through innocent agent machines (if any) to the ultimate source of the attack, as well as devices that allow entry into a remote system for the purpose of gathering information. Though such responses are neither intended nor reasonably likely to cause harm, they are ethically problematic insofar as they are invasive in the following sense: to the extent that the use of a traceback results in an unauthorized entry onto innocent agent machines, it would appear to constitute a trespass-something that is presumptively impermissible.
One might think that such trespasses can be justified under the Necessity Principle. 24 To the extent that intermediate responses can be used reliably to identify the culpable source of a digital attack for the purpose of prosecuting the responsible parties, 25 the important moral good of restoring the public peace by bringing wrongdoers to justice-a good that seems important enough to justify comparatively minor trespasses onto the property of innocent persons.
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Unfortunately, it is frequently unclear whether intermediate responses are likely to succeed in identifying culpable parties. A sophisticated attacker can insulate himor herself from discovery by compromising one set of innocent machines to control another set of innocent machines that will be used to stage the attack-a process that can be iterated several times. However, the greater the number of "hops in the chain" between attacker and victim, the less likely that intermediate responses will succeed in identifying the culpable party. Indeed, it is fair to say that the likelihood of identifying the culpable parties in such attacks by intermediate responses is morally negligible.
This means that the expected moral value (i.e., the magnitude of the good multiplied by the probability of realizing it) to be achieved by using invasive tracebacks is a lower value than is desirable. In contrast, the expected moral disvalue (i.e., the magnitude of the bad multiplied by the probability of realizing it) is significant; although it may be difficult to precisely quantify the magnitude of the evil involved in a trespass, the probability of committing a trespass in using invasive tracebacks against any reasonably sophisticated attack will be close to 1. This militates against the claim that the good that will be achieved by using invasive tracebacks is significantly greater than the bad that will be done.
Moreover, the use of intermediate responses can also have significant collateral impacts that are undesirable from a moral point of view. The use of invasive tracebacks can result in damage to a variety of important trust relationships. A private firm that implements a traceback in an attack staged from the machines of other competing businesses can damage not only trust relationships between those businesses but could also precipitate a response that damages trust relationships between consumers and businesses, potentially resulting in economic losses that are passed on to the public in the form of lost jobs. Even worse, the use of invasive tracebacks by a private firm in response to an attack staged from machines used by state officials of another nation could result in an international incident that damages the relationship between those nations. Again, the point here is not that we have reason to think that these worst-case scenarios are very likely; rather, a victim contemplating an intermediate response cannot reliably estimate the probabilities of such scenarios in such a short period of time. Because the victim cannot reliably assess these probabilities, there is inadequate reason to think that the application-conditions of the Necessity Principle have been satisfied. The Evidentiary Principle seems to preclude adopting intermediate responses in ordinary cases in which the victim lacks fairly detailed knowledge about the source and routing of an attack.
Thus, in most cases, private parties cannot justify adopting intermediate responses on the strength of the Necessity Principle.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the analysis here is limited to current traceback technologies with their limitations. Many researchers are making considerable progress in improving the reliability and efficacy of traceback technologies (see, for example, http://footfall.csc.ncsu.edu, which documents some intriguing advancements in these technologies.)
Indeed, one might reasonably expect that researchers will eventually improve these technologies to the point where they are sufficiently efficacious in identifying culpable parties. Then, they could generally be justified under the Necessity Principle as bringing about the greater moral good of identifying culpable parties to an attack. Thus, although presumptively unjustified under the Necessity Principle at this juncture, this may not be the case for long.
Benign Responses
One might think that benign responses are ethically unproblematic because, by definition, they affect only those physical resources owned by the victim. According to this line of argument, a person has a moral liberty to dispose of property as he or she sees fit. Other things being equal, the property owner has a liberty to make physical alterations in his or her property; thus, for example, I have a liberty to make my home safer by installing a new lock in my door. It might be true that one's obligations to, say, support one's family preclude damaging one's own property in circumstances where doing so renders one unable to support one's family; however, these constraints are exceptional. Persons are at considerable liberty to use or modify their property as they see fit.
This argument is problematic in a couple of ways. First, the party implementing a benign measure may be a nonowner who has authorized control over the owner's resources. The scope of the owner's liberty to dispose of his or her property does not extend in an unrestricted fashion to agents of the owner. What the agent may permissibly do depends on other factors including the terms of the agreement he or she has with the owner.
Second, and more important, the scope of a person's moral liberty with property is limited by the rights of other persons. For example, the fact that an employer E owns a workspace does not imply that E has a right to install cameras in the bathroom to monitor employees. In this case, E's liberty to dispose of E's property is outweighed by the right of E's employees to privacy. Accordingly, the mere fact that benign measures affect only the property of the victim is not by itself sufficient to imply that they are ethically justified; if there are other persons, for example, who have privacy rights (such as might be true of an ISP) that might be violated by benign measures, then such measures are not clearly permissible. Indeed, users of a system might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their files or communications that give rise to privacy rights that would be violated even by benign measures. Such expectations might arise, for example, among users of a university or corporate network.
For this reason, it is not possible to draw any general conclusions about the permissibility of benign responses to digital attacks. Because they will be impermissible in cases where they violate the rights of third parties, it is necessary in any given instance to determine whether there are third parties who have rights that might be violated by the adoption of even benign responses.
The Inadequacy of Law Enforcement Efforts
There is, however, one powerful argument that can be made in defense of the view that it is permissible for private individuals to undertake active response. The argument rests on the idea that the state may legitimately prohibit recourse to self-help measures in dealing with a class of wrongful intrusions or attacks only insofar as it is providing minimally adequate protection against such attacks. If (1) digital intrusions are resulting in significant harm or injury of a kind that the state ought to protect against and (2) the state's protective efforts are inadequate, then private individuals, in this line of reasoning, are entitled to adopt active response measures that conduce to their own protection.
Both antecedent clauses appear to be satisfied. Depending on the target and sophistication of the attack, an unauthorized digital intrusion can result in significant financial losses to its victims. For example, an extended DDoS attack that effectively takes a major online retailer offline for several hours might result in hundreds of thousands of dollars of business going to one of its online rivals. In the worst-case scenario, these financial losses can result in the loss of value to shareholders and ultimately the loss of jobs. It seems clear that the harms potentially resulting from digital intrusions fall within a class that the state ought to protect against.
Further, there is good reason to think that the state's protective efforts are inadequate. At this point in time, law enforcement agencies lack adequate resources to pursue investigations in the vast majority of computer intrusions. Even when there are sufficient resources to justify the state in intervening, the response is likely to come long after the damage is done. That law enforcement has just not been able to keep pace with the rapidly growing problems posed by digital attackers is not a matter of controversy.
There are a variety of reasons for this inadequate response. Most obviously, the availability of resources for combating cybercrime is constrained by fiscal and political realities; if the public is vehemently opposed to tax increases that would increase the resources for investigating cybercrime, then the growth of those resources will not keep pace with an increasing rate of intrusions. Equally important, there are special complexities involved in investigating and prosecuting digital intrusions. First, according to Mitchell and Banker (1998) , investigation of digital intrusions is resource-intensive: "[w]hereas a typical (non-'high-tech') state or local law-enforcement officer may carry between forty and fifty cases at a time, a hightech investigator has a full-time job handling three or four cases a month." Second, most sophisticated attacks pose jurisdictional complexities that increase the expense of law enforcement efforts because such attacks frequently involve crossing jurisdictional lines. For example, an attacker in one country might compromise machines in another country in order to stage an attack on a network in yet a third country.
Though such considerations show that the growing problem associated with digital intrusions demands an effective response of some kind, they fall short of showing that it is permissible, as a general matter, for private parties to undertake intermediate or aggressive active response measures. The argument above assumes that private individuals can do what the state cannot-namely, protect themselves adequately from the threats posed by digital intrusion. That is to say, the argument assumes that private active response is likely to be efficacious in achieving legitimate objectives.
At this time, however, there is very little reason to think that this underlying assumption is correct. For starters, invasive intermediate measures intended to collect information are likely to succeed in identifying culpable parties, as noted above, in only direct attacks staged from the attacker's own computer, or by unskilled or careless attackers; such measures are not likely to succeed in identifying parties culpable for intrusions that are staged from innocent machines or where a high degree of preparation and sophistication are involved. 27 Because an attacker sophisticated enough to stage an attack likely to result in significant damage is also likely to be sophisticated enough to interpose at least one layer of innocent machines between attacker and target, there is little reason to think that invasive investigatory measures are likely to achieve their legitimate objectives in precisely those attacks that are likely to result in the sort of damage that the state is obligated to protect against.
Moreover, aggressive measures are not likely to succeed in protecting the victim in any reasonably sophisticated attack. As noted above, aggressive countermeasures are not usually calculated to result in the cessation of the attack and can instead frequently result in escalating the attack; for this reason, such countermeasures are not likely to succeed in achieving legitimate objectives that are purely defensive in character. Further, aggressive countermeasures cannot succeed in achieving legitimate punitive objectives in attacks staged from innocent machines. Punitive measures directed at the innocent agents do nothing by way of either punishing the ultimate source of the attack or deterring future attacks. A reasonably sophisticated attacker who knows the target will respond with aggressively punitive measures can simply interpose an additional layer of innocent machines to insulate himor herself from the target.
Yet, if the above argument fails to justify active response by private victims, it succeeds in showing that the problem of digital intrusions needs an effective coordinated solution of some kind-one that involves, at the very least, the sanction and cooperation of the state. One notable proposal deserves mention here. Mitchell and Banker (1998) have suggested a private-public solution 27 Just as in physical crimes, however, it is nearly impossible to eliminate all traces of an intruder's presence and all tracks from all involved systems. As the attacker's skill increases, so must the skills of the defender in order to find and understand the significance of the latent traces.
that involves state licensing of security professionals who are trained in responding to digital intrusions and who are authorized to do so subject to certain constraints. It is reasonable to hypothesize that an evaluation of such proposals will become the focus of normative research on active response in the near future.
THE LEGALITY OF ACTIVE RESPONSE
Although no Western nation has any statutes that explicitly address the legality of active response, there are a number of laws that potentially apply to it. This section discusses some of these laws and their potential application to the various levels of active responses. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the discussion in this section is tentative (and should not in any event be construed as authoritative legal advice). It is clear only that the legality of the various active responses remains unsettled at this time in every Western nation.
The United States
The federal law most likely to create liability for active response is Section 1030(a)(5) of the Computer Crime and Fraud Act (i.e., 18 U.S. Code Section 1030), which provides as follows: Whoever . . . (A)(i) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; (ii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or (iii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage; and (B) by conduct described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A), caused (or in the case of an attempted offense, would, if completed, have caused)-(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value; (ii) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals; (iii) physical injury to any person; (iv) a threat to public health or safety; or (v) damage affecting a computer system used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
Subsection (c) authorizes fines and imprisonment of up to twenty years for specified violations of the quoted provision.
Although the relevant provisions apply only to "protected computers," the definition of that category is potentially broad. In particular, it includes any "computer . . . used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication." Construed literally, this provision would include any computer that has been used to send an email from a person in one state to a person in another state or used to access any Web page that is published on a network in a different state from the user-which would seem to include every computer capable of being attacked.
As the statute does not make exceptions for active response, persons adopting active responses to hacker attacks could potentially be prosecuted under the Act. For starters, it is highly likely that any computer being used in a hacker attack will satisfy the definition of a "protected computer"; if an active response measure results in statutorily sufficient damage, it could result in liability. It is true, of course, that the Act is most likely to apply to aggressive measures as these are intended to inflict damage or harm on the attacker. However, it could also apply to intermediate responses, such as invasive tracebacks, that deliberately trespass against external machines to identify attack paths. In the event that such measures proximately result in damage to those machines, they can give rise to liability under the Act.
Indeed, even benign measures might give rise to liability under certain circumstances. The mere fact that the user has property rights in a network does not, by itself, imply that the user is legally authorized to access computers on that network because computer users may have privacy rights that insulate their computers from certain kinds of access. To the extent that network owners access computers or files on those computers protected by such rights without appropriate authorization, they might be subject to liability for even benign measures that result in the right kinds of damage.
28
Canada
Canada has several statutes potentially applicable to active response. For example, Section 342.1(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code provides:
Every one who, fraudulently and without colour of right (a) obtains, directly or indirectly, any computer service, (b) by means of an electromagnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device, intercepts or causes to be intercepted, directly or indirectly, any function of a computer system, (c) uses or causes to be used, directly or indirectly, a computer system with intent to commit an offence under paragraph (a) or (b) or an offence under section 430 in relation to data or a computer system, or (d) uses, possesses, traffics in or permits another person to have access to a computer password that would enable a person to commit an offence under paragraph (a), (b) or (c) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Another statute that is potentially applicable to active response is Section 430 (1.1), which defines the crime of 28 State laws may also be applicable. A growing number of states are enacting statutes that criminalize various forms of computer misuse that include, but are not limited to, unauthorized computer intrusions. mischief as follows: "Every one commits mischief who willfully (a) destroys or alters data; (b) renders data meaningless, useless or ineffective; (c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawful use of data; or (d ) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person in the lawful use of data or denies access to data to any person who is entitled to access thereto."
Literally construed, the language of both sections seems applicable to the most aggressive active response measures. Section 430 requires that destruction, alteration, obstruction, or interruption of data be "willful" as is true of the most aggressive active response measures: after all, such measures are, by definition, calculated to inflict harm or damage on those computers from which digital attacks are staged. Section 342.1 not only applies to these measures by incorporating the requirements of Section 430, but also by setting a less stringent standard for violation: merely obtaining unauthorized access (a necessary precondition for inflicting the sort of damage intended by aggressive active response) seems sufficient to subject a person to liability.
In contrast, only Section 342. The legality of benign responses under Section 342.1 turns on the same issues as discussed above in connection with the Computer Crimes and Fraud Act.
The European Union
On November 8, 2001, the Committee of Ministers of the Council formerly adopted the Convention on Cybercrime, which states guidelines for the various members of the European Union in formulating law regarding computer misuse (Council of Europe, 2001) . Section 1 of Chapter II of the Convention states guidelines for formulating substantive criminal law as it pertains to unauthorized access to computers, unauthorized interception of data, data interference, system interference, misuse of computing devices, computer fraud, child pornography, and copyright infractions. Article 2 of the Convention is of particular relevance for our purposes as it defines the relevant guidelines for criminalizing unauthorized access of computer technologies. Article 2 provides as follows:
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right. A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing security measures, with the intent of obtaining computer data or other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system. Insofar as the defining characteristic of a hacker attack is the attempt to gain unauthorized access, Article 2 purports to guide the adoption of criminal laws regarding hacker attacks-and potentially active response.
Notably, the Convention on Cybercrime is also motivated by a concern to address the problems that arise out of the transnational character of cyberspace: "Given the cross-border nature of information networks, a concerted international effort is needed to deal with such misuse." Chapter III defines the guidelines for international cooperation. Article 23 expresses the general tenor of the principles governing international cooperation: "The Parties shall co-operate with each other, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and through application of relevant international instruments on international cooperation in criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and domestic laws, to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence." Remaining Articles define principles of extradition and other principles requiring mutual assistance among nations.
Legal Analogues of the Defense and Necessity Principles
The criminal law of most, if not all, Western nations incorporates principles that allow for the forceful defense of innocent persons and that allow for an otherwise wrongful act when necessary to secure a good that is significantly greater than the evil created by the commission of that act.
For example, the penal statutes of New York State contain analogues of both the Defense and Necessity Principles. Section 35.15 states the analogue of the Defense Principle: "A person may . . . use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person."
29 Section 35.05 states the analogue of the Necessity Principle: "conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when . . . [it] is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor, and which is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue."
These defenses, however, do not necessarily apply to the active response continuum. First, such statutes typically incorporate an evidentiary precondition for acting justifiably under the relevant defenses. Section 35.15 allows force only where the agent "reasonably believes" it is necessary. Similarly, Section 35.05 allows an otherwise 29 Penal Code, New York State Consolidated Laws (http://assembly.state. ny.us/leg/?cl=82&a=12).
wrongful act only when the moral goods "clearly outweigh" the moral evils. Even assuming that the courts in any particular jurisdiction are willing in principle to apply these sorts of provisions to active response contexts, the same sort of epistemic problems arise in the criminal context as in the ethical context. Second, these statutes have been enacted with certain paradigmatic offenses in mind that do not include digital attacks. Consider, for example, the Model Penal Code's comment on the necessity defense:
Under this section, property may be destroyed to prevent the spread of a fire. A speed limit may be violated in pursuing a suspected criminal. An ambulance may pass a traffic light. Mountain climbers lost in a storm may take refuge in a house or may appropriate provisions. Cargo may be jettisoned or an embargo violated to preserve the vessel. An alien may violate a curfew in order to reach an air raid shelter. A druggist may dispense a drug without the requisite prescription to alleviate grave distress in an emergency.
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As is readily evident, these examples do not anticipate the application of the necessity defense to digital contexts. For such reasons, it is simply not clear that courts are willing to apply these defenses to the digital context.
CONCLUSIONS
The active response continuum comprises a variety of noncooperative measures that are intended to respond to a digital intrusion in ways that have a causal impact on remote machines. Such measures include acts that would fairly be characterized as hackingin circumstances in which they were unprovoked by an intrusion. They range from more benign measures intended to inflict no damage to highly aggressive measures intended to inflict the same kind of damage on the attacker that he or she is attempting to inflict on the victim. These tactics include sniffing, scanning, tracebacks, corruption of data, remote exploitation, and denial of service attacks.
Because of their invasive quality, active response measures raise a variety of normative issues. Denial of service counterattacks, for example, raise prudential, ethical, and legal issues. Responding to a DoS attack with proportional force might actually result in increased harm to the victim insofar as it evokes an escalation of the attack; it might thus adversely affect the victim's own interests. Further, if the attack is distributed, the counterattack will necessarily be directed at innocent agent machines, raising serious ethical and legal issues. For all these reasons, such aggressive measures are ill-advised.
Nevertheless, the growing frequency of hacker attacks and the increasing inability of law enforcement agencies to respond adequately suggest the need for a coordinated solution involving both public and private elements. The key to keeping owners/operators from resorting to noncooperative, invasive active response measures might be for
